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Humans recognise and respond to robots as social agents, to such
extent that they occasionally aempt to bully a robot. e current
paper investigates whether aggressive behaviour directed towards
robots is inuenced by the same social processes that guide human
bullying behaviour. More specically, it measured the eects of
dehumanisation primes and anthropomorphic qualities of the robot
on participants’ verbal abuse of a virtual robotic agents. Contrary
to previous ndings in human-human interaction, priming partici-
pants with power did not result in less mind aribution. However,
evidence for dehumanisation was still found, as the less mind par-
ticipants aributed to the robot, the more aggressive responses they
gave. In the main study this eect was moderated by the manipu-
lations of power and robot anthropomorphism; the low anthropo-
morphic robot in the power prime condition endured signicantly
less abuse, and mind aribution remained a signicant predictor for
verbal aggression in all conditions save the low anthropomorphic
robot with no prime. It is concluded that dehumanisation occurs
in human-robot interaction and that like in human-human inter-
action, it is linked to aggressive behaviour. Moreover, it is argued
that this dehumanisation is dierent from anthropomorphism as
well as human-human dehumanisation, since anthropomorphism
itself did not predict aggressive behaviour and dehumanisation of
robots was not inuenced by primes that have been established in
human-human dehumanisation research.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, a small cleaning robot was assigned an unsu-
pervised job at a public square while scientists were conducting a
eld experiment with a larger and more sophisticated robot nearby.
However, things did not go quite as planned, as the cleaning robot
was approached by random bystanders and abused - in the absence
of any form of provocation from the robot. e baed scientists
had to hastily reach for their cell phones to capture this unexpected
form of human-robot interaction. Salvini et al. [53] noted that “the
nature of the abuses suered by the robots […] is much more similar to
bullying behaviours than vandalism. […] In the case of urban robots,
acts of vandalism could be, for instance, crashing the touch screen
monitor, seing re to the robot, or keying the robot cover. On the
contrary, what we noticed during the behavioural study were actions
aimed at forcing the robot to do or not to something or, in a few cases,
simulations of “physical” aacks” [53, p. 371].
Humans recognise robots as social actors. ey talk to them
[4] as if they understand what is being said, they punish them
when they prove to be a bad teammate [3] but also feel sorry for
them when they are being punished [55], and even try to prevent
them from geing hurt [9, 55]. Our brain responds to robots as if
they were giving o social cues; activating mirror neurons when
watching a robot perform an action [18], activating neural networks
linked to the theory of mind when playing a game with a robot
[30], and activating areas associated with emotional empathy when
watching a robot geing hurt [50]. Many studies report on how
people engage in social interaction with robots [26].
However, not all social behaviours are positive. e cleaning
robot from the Salvini et al. [53] study is not alone in being abused;
Brscić et al. [5] observed how kids aacked a robot that was pa-
trolling a shopping mall. Aer multiple failed aempts to design
robot behaviour that could stop these aggressive tendencies, the
authors had to program the robot in such a way that it simply
avoided potential bullies (i.e., any kid-sized human). Of course,
robots are the ideal target for bullying as they are in a clear subor-
dinate position, will not retort in kind, and cannot feel any pain,
which absolves the aggressor from any moral consequence [11].
is is not to say that robot bullying should be tolerated. From
an ethical perspective, some behaviours can be deemed immoral
even if performed on a entity that is incapable of any suering, like
a robot [57]. Since the robot is recognised by the human as a social
actor, abusing it might encourage treating other humanlike beings
(e.g. actual humans) in a similar way [65]. More generally speaking,
the assertion “I can do whatever I desire with a robot” rests upon
the idea that all and any actions are acceptable as long as no-one
gets harmed [48], which even in the most libertarian societies is
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not a commonly shared aitude [65]. And from a pragmatic point
of view, robot abuse can result in considerable damage to the robot
and hazardous situations for both the robot and bystanders [11].
Research on the reasons behind robot bullying is still sparse
[10] and oen involves anecdotal observations [53]. e current
paper will thus dive into the psychological motivations behind ro-
bot bullying behaviour. More specically, it will manipulate how
humanlike a robot is perceived, using the theoretical frameworks
of dehumanisation and anthropomorphism, and measure the ef-
fects of this manipulation on bullying behaviour. e goal is to
experimentally show that aggressive behaviour towards robots is a
social phenomenon, and is guided by the same social processes as
aggressive behaviour towards humans.
1.1 Perceiving (non)human
In 1994, Nass et al. [44] found that humans treat computers as if they
are social actors; a nding that inspired his “Media Equation” theory,
which states that humans will automatically respond to media as if
it is real life [46]. In a series of experiments, it was shown that for
well-established human interaction mechanisms, the interaction
partner can be substituted with a computer without changing the
behavioural outcomes. Later studies further conrmed that people
interact with machines and media as if they are social agents [40].
e Media Equation extends to robots as well. When playing a
cooperative game with either a robotic or a human partner, partici-
pants apply the same social norms to both partners, punishing bad
performance and rewarding good performance [3]. With increasing
humanlikeness in a robot, activation of the brain regions that are
associated with the theory-of-mind neural network is enhanced
[30]. Moreover, seeing a robot hand carrying out a series of move-
ments activates the same mirror neurons in the brain as observing
a human hand [18], further suggesting that the brain processes
robots (to some degree) as if they are human agents.
e phenomenon of seeing human characteristics in nonhuman
agents is called anthropomorphism (from the Greek words “anthro-
pos”, meaning “human”, and “morphe”, meaning “form”): the rst
mention of the word stems from the sixth century BC [34]. Epley
et al. [13] drew a motivational framework for anthropomorphism
that rests on three factors. Two are human needs: the need to
understand and predict the behaviour of other agents and the need
to be social. e third factor is related to the agent and considers
how much it resembles a human in appearance and behaviour.
Waytz et al. [64] conrmed the validity of the rst factor in the
human-robot interaction eld by showing that robots behaving
in an unpredictable way have higher anthropomorphism ratings.
Moreover, when participants are dealing with unpredictable robots,
a brain region that is involved with inferring mental states of other
agents becomes activated, suggesting that the robots are indeed
recognised as having a mind of their own.
e second factor was conrmed when loneliness was shown to
correlate with the tendency to assign a mind to interactive gadgets
(like an alarm clock that “runs away” when it goes o). Moreover,
aer a feeling of loneliness was experimentally induced, partici-
pants had a greater tendency to anthropomorphise a wide range of
nonhuman agents: pets, God, and a series of ambiguous drawings
in which one might perceive the features of a face [12].
Finally, the validity of the agent factor was experimentally con-
rmed by Eyssel et al. [14], who showed that the relationship be-
tween psychological closeness to and the anthropomorphism of
robots depends on the robots voice. When the robot had a syn-
thesised voice, the gender of the robots voice didn’t inuence an-
thropomorphism ratings in participants; but when it had a human
voice, robots with a voice that matched the participants’ gender
were rated as more anthropomorphous.
e Media Equation can however not be equated to anthropo-
morphism completely [4]. Although humans apply social norms
when interacting with a robot, they also display certain behaviours
that would be unacceptable in human-anthropomorphous animal
behaviour; for example, switching o the robot whenever they
become bored with it. So while robots are recognised as social
agents, their perceived humanlikeness is somehow dierent from
the humanlikeness of anthropomorphous animals. is suggests
that anthropomorphism is not a uni-dimensional construct, but
involves a more complex mental process.
A related theoretical framework called mind perception provides
a possible explanation. Mind perception theory states that the
perception of a mind in other agents, human or not, is guided by
two dimensions: Experience and Agency [19]. e rst dimension
entails to what extent an agent is thought to be capable of expe-
riencing thoughts, feelings, and the world around it. Agents who
are high in Experience and low on Agency are perceived as being
less responsible for their actions, more prone to feeling hurt, and
thus deserving of protection. e second dimension indicates to
what extent the agent is seen as capable of self control, memory,
planning, and moral judgement. Beings high in Agency but low on
Experience are considered to be responsible for their own actions
and less deserving of protection from harm, as they don’t have (a
rich set of) feelings and supposedly can take care of themselves.
In the survey of Gray et al. [19], robots scored high on Agency
but low on Experience, whereas animals scored high on Experience
but low on Agency (this study however stems from 2006, before
the eld of social robotics took o. Robots nowadays may be seen
as more capable of Experience). is would explain why robots and
animals are not anthropomorphous in the same way: since robots
are rated high on Agency instead of Experience, one can harm them
without feeling bad [19]. Indeed, increasing Agency traits in a robot
did not do much for its anthropomorphism or likeability ratings,
but increasing its Experience traits resulted in it being perceived as
more anthropomorphic and likeable [52, 67].
So in general, humans perceive robots as humanlike mostly
to the extent that they are independent and autonomous. But if
the seings are right, the perceived capability of a robot to fully
experience the world around it can be tweaked as well. Together
with the notion that bullying is a social behaviour (albeit a negative
one), this suggests that in order to explain robot bullying behaviour,
one should look at which psychological mechanisms come into play
when humans get mean towards each other.
1.2 Humanness and aggression
e mechanisms underlying human-on-human aggression are ex-
plained in dehumanisation theory. Perceiving another as less hu-
man allows people to disregard the (negative) consequences of their
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behaviour and thus decreases empathy towards the victim [7, 36].
Haslam [21] denes two sets of characteristics that determine hu-
manness: Human Nature (HN) and Uniquely Human (UH) traits
[see also 23]. UH traits and capabilities are presumably reserved for
humans only, like higher forms of cognition. HN on the other hand
involves traits and capabilities that are shared with other animals,
but are at the same time considered fundamental to being human,
like fear or joy. Perceiving less HN traits in an agent results in
a ‘mechanistic’ form of dehumanisation; in humans, this form of
dehumanisation is applied to for example bankers and businessmen.
Alternatively, perceiving less UH traits results in an ‘animalistic’
form of dehumanisation [21, 23]; this form of dehumanisation is
commonly applied to women or the mentally disabled.
Dehumanisation can be triggered by stable factors like trait char-
acteristics of the person who dehumanises (e.g. narcissism and
conservatism) and of the victim (e.g. social class, gender); but also
circumstantial factors like emotional state, a sense of power, or
self-focus [22]. Interestingly, although agents high on HN traits
are seen as more deserving of protection, animalistic dehumanisa-
tion is still related to a decrease in empathy [8] and both types of
dehumanisation are related to increased aggression [22, 33].
Dehumanisation theory shows considerable overlap with anthro-
pomorphism, to the point where it has been suggested that they are
two approaches of the same concept [63]. Applying this claim to
research, Loughnan et al. [38] applied a dehumanisation framework
on non-human agents and showed that UH traits were more readily
associated with robots, while HN traits were more easily linked
to animals. However, not all scholars agree that dehumanisation
and anthropomorphism are each others reverse. For example, in
one study neither robot appearance nor perceived intentionality
inuenced the mind or moral agency aributed to it. A more hu-
man appearance of the robot resulted in an increase in ascribed UH
and HN traits; but at the same time less perceived intentionality
correlated with a higher aribution of UH traits [68].
e inconsistency in ndings might be explained by the many
dierent approaches that have been used to measure dehumanisa-
tion and anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism has been opera-
tionalised in many dierent ways by dierent researchers [27, 51]:
from the humanness subscale of the revised Godspeed question-
naire [24], which quite straightforwardly asks the participant to
rate the robots on scales like ‘living versus inanimate’ and ‘human-
made versus humanlike’ [41, 67]; to home-craed questionnaires
[15, 49, 50]; to mind aribution questionnaires [12, 14, 64] and UH
and HN aribution measurements [37, 52], which hold the (implicit)
assumption of dehumanisation and anthropomorphism being each
others opposite. is makes it virtually impossible to tease apart
anthropomorphism, dehumanisation, and mind aribution in the
literature.
1.3 Current studies
e current studies follow a 2 (dehumanisation tendencies) x 2
(anthropomorphism of the robot) between participant design. Par-
ticipants are either primed to dehumanise or receive a control task,
and then engage in a scripted dialogue with a virtual NAO robot
(see Figure 1) which is either high or low in anthropomorphism. e
main dependent variable is the proportion of negative or aggressive
responses compared to the number of positive interactions.
We hypothesise that participants who received a dehumanisation
prime will be be more aggressive to the robot than the control
group. Moreover, we expect that this eect is stronger for a high
anthropomorphic robot compared to a low anthropomorphic robot.
To manipulate dehumanisation, a feeling of power is primed in
participants, as this manipulates dehumanisation tendencies [20]
but not anthropomorphism [28]. Both the use of a human voice
[14] and the inclusion of social cues through movement [43] have
been shown to increase perceived anthropomorphism of a robot.
Two questionnaires are administered at the end of the experiment
as manipulation checks.
e online seing was partly chosen because it provides easy
access to an enormous pool of potential participants, but also be-
cause it reduces inhibition and self-consciousness in participants
through the “online disinhibition eect” [58]. Although on- and
oine bullying do not dier in principle, as reported by both per-
petrators and victims [42], people are more likely to bully online
than oine [39]. is is due to the invisibility and anonymity of
the aggressor and victim, and the lack of bystanders who might
intervene [31, 58], among other things. ese factors lower the
threshold for interhuman aggression [62] as well as aggression
towards a virtual robot [10]. It is thus assumed here that using an
online platform may enhance the eect but will not alter the nature
of the factors that moderate bullying tendencies towards robots.
Similarly, interaction with a virtual robot is not fundamentally
dierent from interaction with an embodied one. Previous studies
have shown that virtual representations of robots elicit more social
behaviour (like mimicking expressions, empathy, polite behaviour,
and physiological responses) than audiotapes or text [50, 55], indi-
cating that virtual robots too are recognised as social agents. Li [35]
conducted a meta-analysis on papers that studied the inuence of
agent embodiment on users’ perception of the agent, and concluded
that embodied robots elicit stronger behavioural and aitudinal
responses than virtual agents. However, several studies which had
found no dierence in behavioural and aitudinal responses for
Figure 1: e robot in the opening scene of the experiment
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virtual agents and physical robots were missing n this analysis [for
example 45, 47]. More recent studies also found that the perception
of and response to virtual agents is identical to embodied robots
[59, 66]. ellman et al. [59] found that it is social presence (i.e.
whether the robot is perceived as a social actor that manifests hu-
manness [32]) rather than physical presence that predicts the social
inuence of a robot. Moreover, social presence was not inuenced
by the physical embodiment of the robot in their experiment.
While the literature is still on the fence on to what extent virtual
and embodied robots are interchangeable, we argue that the under-
lying psychological mechanisms are the same (but the intensity of
the experience may or may not dier). us, while our experiment
features a virtual robot in an online seing, we feel condent that
the gist of the ndings can be applied to embodied robots too.
2 PILOT STUDY
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Participants. Participants were approached on a number
of platforms, but mainly signed up via online crowdsourcing compa-
nies CrowdFlower and Amazon Mechanical Turk. Data from these
platforms has been shown to be of equal quality as on-campus
recruitment or participant data from forums [2, 54]. For the cur-
rent study, compliant with the common reimbursement rates on
those websites, participants were paid $1.25 USD for completing
the study. In addition to CrowdFlower and Amazon, the experiment
was also distributed through the university Facebook page and the
forum r/SampleSize on the online platform Reddit. Participants
who signed up via these platforms did not get reimbursed.
232 participants completed the interaction and questionnaires.
17 participants clearly did not comply with the essay guidelines
(i.e. did not write on the provided topic or copy-pasted their essay
o of the internet) and were removed from the dataset. irty
participants failed the aention question and were removed as well.
e resulting dataset thus held 185 participants. 39% of them were
male; the average age was 38 years (SD = 11.5); the majority listed
the USA as their country of residence (66%).
2.1.2 Procedure. Participants were told that the study was a
pilot for evaluating a virtual robot agent that would introduce the
lab robots to children. Aer providing demographic information,
they were asked to write a 200 word essay on either what they
would do if they were president with unrestricted power for a
day (power prime, dehumanisation condition) or the last time they
visited a mall (control condition). is part was framed as a check
of their prociency in English.
Aer submiing their essay, participants were reminded to turn
on the sound on their device and keep it on during the whole
interaction. ey were then shown a virtual environment with the
robot, which introduced itself to them as one of the robots in the
HITlab of the University of Canterbury. e robot either had a
humanlike voice and gave o social cues through movement (high
anthropomorphism condition) or spoke with a synthesised voice
and was shown in stills (low anthropomorphism condition).
Participants engaged in a scripted interaction with the robot,
where they could respond to the robot by selecting either of two or
three responses presented to them on the screen. Sometimes, all
options were neutral, but in roughly 90% of the cases one response
was positive and another negative or abusive in nature. If a positive
answer option was given, there always was a negative response
option as well, and vice versa.
Aer the participant had selected their response, the robot would
give its reaction. ese reactions diered depending on the selected
response. To ensure that the participants fully understood what
the robot had said, a transcript appeared on the screen once it was
done talking. Participants could also refresh the page in order to
re-listen to what the robot had to say. e whole interaction took
10-15 minutes.
Aer the interaction, the participants were presented with a new
screen, which informed them that the interaction part was now
over, and were asked to rate the virtual agent on two questionnaires
(the anthropomorphism and dehumanisation manipulation check
measurements). When the participants had given their opinion
on the nal item, they were debriefed and asked to submit their
answers to the database.
2.1.3 Materials. e scripted interaction was designed in Twine,
an open-source application for creating interactive nonlinear sto-
ries. Due to the nonlinear story line, there were many possible
interaction paths. e response that the participant got from the
robot depended on the answer option they had selected. For exam-
ple, if the robot said “[I]t’s rather dark in the storage room where
they put us [the robots]. […] So in spite of not being alone, it can
get boring”, the participant could choose between “I am sorry to
hear that” and “is is stupid. You are a robot, you can’t feel”. Upon
picking the rst response, the robot would react in a friendly way,
assuring the participant it wasn’t all that bad. Alternatively, if the
participant chose the second option, the robot would respond in a
sad and insecure manner, and change the topic.
e robot voice in the low anthropomorphism condition was
generated by the text-to-speech function in the text editor soware
[25]. e robot voice in the high anthropomorphism condition
was recorded from a native English speaking student. e robots’
movements in the high anthropomorphism condition were recorded
from the Choregraphe simulation window [1] and edited to change
the background with Adobe Aer Eects [56].
2.1.4 Measurements.
Aggression measurement. e proportion of negative responses
was used as a measurement of aggression, and used as dependent
variable in the binomial models that were dened. Only responses
where both a negative and a positive response option had been
presented were taken into account.
Manipulation checks. A manipulation check was included for
both dehumanisation and anthropomorphism. For the dehumani-
sation manipulation check, the mind aribution scale (MAS) from
Kozak et al. [29] was used. In this questionnaire participants rate to
what extent the robot is capable of experiencing each of ten men-
tal capabilities (e.g. “capability of experiencing complex feelings”,
“capability of engaging in planned action”). Since being capable of
feelings and thoughts is central to being human [38], dehumanisa-
tion would show in less aributed mind to the robot.
For the anthropomorphism manipulation check, the humanlike-
ness subscale of the revised Godspeed questionnaire (GQr) [24]
was used. In this questionnaire, participants rate a robot on six
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bipolar scales, e.g. “synthetic - real”, “living - inanimate”, and “with-
out denite lifespan - mortal”. In both questionnaires, items were
measured on an 11-point Likert scale.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Reliability, randomisation and manipulation check. e
reliability of both questionnaires was assessed by calculating Cron-
bach’s alpha. e GQr had an alpha of .83; the MAS had an alpha
of .90. us, both questionnaires were considered reliable. To make
interpretation easier, the full MAS was reverse-scored so that a
higher score indicated a lower degree of mind aribution and thus
a higher degree of dehumanisation.
e four conditions did not dier signicantly from each other in
participants’ mean age, gender, or country of residence; or with re-
spect to the total number of interactions per participant. e groups
did not dier signicantly in sample size, χ2(3, N = 185) = 4.25, p
= .24, with 40 participants in the low anthropomorphism/control
condition, 58 in the high anthropomorphism/control condition, 45
in the low anthropomorphism/dehumanisation condition, and 42
in the high anthropomorphism/dehumanisation condition.
Participants in the high anthropomorphism condition rated their
robot as signicantly more anthropomorphous (M = 5.76, SD = 2.10)
than participants in the low anthropomorphism condition (M =
4.90, SD = 2.17), F (1,181) = 6.25, p = .01, no main eect for the de-
humanisation condition or interaction term, ps > .35. Participants
in the dehumanisation condition did not aribute signicantly less
mind to their robot (M = 5.93, SD = 2.01) compared to the control
condition (M = 5.78, SD = 2.27), F (1,181) = .14, p = .70, no signicant
main eect for the anthropomorphism condition or interaction
term, ps > .33. us, the manipulation of anthropomorphism had
been successful, but the power prime had not led to a greater degree
of dehumanisation of the robot. As it did not manipulate dehuman-
isation tendencies, the dehumanisation condition will from this
point on be referred to as the power prime condition. e MAS
scores will be used as an indication of dehumanisation instead. See
Table 2 for the mean score on both questionnaires.
On average, 75% of participants’ interaction paths overlapped
(SD = .08%).
2.2.2 Main analysis. Four binomial regression models are pro-
posed and compared below. For all models, the dependent variable
was the proportion of negative responses. e predictor variables
were a composition of either or both conditions and the score on
the MAS. To make interpretation easier, the scores on the MAS had
been centered beforehand. Chi-square statistics are used to assess if
a proposed model is beer at predicting aggressive responses than
the null model (which holds no predictors). e Akaike informa-
tion criterion (AIC) is used to compare the models amongst each
other, with a lower AIC score indicating a beer t compared to
the alternative model and a dierence (∆AIC ) of less than 2 points
indicating that the models are roughly equivalent [6].
e rst model that was put up for comparison followed the
original analysis plan and had as predictors the two conditions and
an interaction term. is model had no signicant predictors, all
-.85 < z < .54, all ps > .40, and it thus did not do any beer than
the null model at predicting aggressive responses, χ2(3, N = 185) =
2.36, p = .50; AIC = 867.1.
Table 1: Descriptives of themodels predicting the aggression
ratio in the pilot study
Predictors b z AIC
Model 1 (intercept) −1.64 −13.93***
ant 0.08 0.54
power −0.14 −0.85
ant×power 0.00 0.02 867.1






power×MAS −0.16 −0.71 711.61
Model 4 (intercept) −1.82 −29.24***
MAS 0.33 12.04*** 708.27
†, *, **, and *** denote signicance at p < .10, p < .05, p < .01, and p
< .001, respectively (two-tailed).
In the second model, the MAS score and power prime condition
were added as predictor variables and twice each as an interaction
variable. e MAS score was the only signicant predictor, b =
.41, z = 7.88, p < .001, although an interaction between MAS and
anthropomorphism approached signicance, b = −.10, z = −1.78, p
= .08. e model was a signicant improvement over the null model,
χ2(6, N = 185) = 163.85, p < .001; the AIC indicated a preference
for the second model over the rst, AIC = 711.61, ∆AIC = 155.49.
In the third model, the power prime condition was removed
from the model, leaving the MAS score and the anthropomorphism
condition as main eects and interaction. In this model as well,
only the MAS score predicted aggression; b = .38, z = 8.82, p <
.001, although an interaction between MAS and anthropomorphism
once more approached signicance, b = −.09, z = −1.70, p = .09.
is model predicted aggressive responses signicantly beer than
the null model, χ2(3, N = 185) = 160.35, p < .001; the AIC dierence
indicated a slight preference for the third model over the second,
AIC = 709.11, ∆AIC = 2.5.
us, a nal model was dened containing only the MAS score
as a predictor; b = .33, z = 12.04, p < .001. is model as well was
signicant, χ2(1, N = 185) = 157.19, p < .001; the AIC indicated it to
be preferable over the second, and roughly equivalent to the third
model, AIC = 708.27, ∆AIC = 3.34 and ∆AIC = .84, respectively.
Since model 3 and 4 t the data equally well, there is no statistical
incentive to prefer one over the other. However, as the MAS score
was the only signicant predictor in model 3, Occam’s razor is ap-
plied and model 4 is identied as the model that predicts aggressive
responses best. See Table 1 for the statistics of model 1, 2 and 4
(since model 3 and 4 were very similar in their outcomes, model 3
is not included).
2.3 Discussion
Two main ndings emerged in the pilot study. Firstly, the results
indicate that mind aribution is predictive of robot bullying. e
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Table 2: estionnaire descriptives per condition for both studies
GQr (SD) MAS (SD)
low anthrop. high anthrop. total low anthrop. high anthrop. total
Pilot study Control 4.97 (2.21) 6.06 (2.16) 5.62 (2.24) 5.92 (2.10) 5.69 (2.38) 5.78 (2.27)
Power prime 4.83 (2.15) 5.33 (1.96) 5.07 (2.06) 5.74 (2.00) 6.14 (2.03) 5.93 (2.01)
total 4.90 (2.17) 5.76 (2.10) 5.36 (2.17) 5.83 (2.04) 5.93 (2.24) 5.85 (2.15)
Main study Control 4.99 (2.03) 6.65 (1.54) 5.77 (1.98) 5.27 (2.27) 5.20 (1.30) 5.24 (1.86)
Power prime 5.52 (2.23) 6.59 (2.25) 6.07 (2.29) 5.80 (2.23) 5.31 (1.97) 5.55 (2.10)
total 5.27 (2.13) 6.61 (1.96) 5.94 (2.15) 5.55 (2.25) 5.27 (1.70) 5.41 (1.99)
less mind is aributed to a robot, the more aggressive responses it
will get. Whether the robot was moving and talking with a human
voice, or still and speaking with a computer generated voice did
not have any signicant inuence on aggression. ese ndings
have a few implications.
ey suggest that the relation between anthropomorphism and
dehumanisation is more complicated than “two sides of the same
coin”. One can manipulate “aliveness” of a robot without aecting
the mind that is aributed to it, or the bullying that it will suer.
e interaction between mind aribution and anthropomorphism
suggested that the inuence of mind aribution might be modied
by robot looks in such a way that mind gets less relevant as the
robot looks more humanlike, but this interaction did not reach
statistical signicance. ese ndings are in line with the ndings
from Zlotowski et al. [68], who found that robot appearance does
not aect mind aribution, and the assertion of ellman et al. [59]
that the social presence of a robot, not its embodiment, is the main
factor in shaping aective and behavioural reactions.
Moreover, although power priming as a dehumanisation ma-
nipulation failed, the results indicate that human-robot aggression
is related to the same psychological processes that guide human-
human aggression. Perceiving the robot as less capable of thinking
and feeling increases the number of aempts to hurt a robot, instead
of taking away the incentive for bullying. Due to the study setup, a
causal direction unfortunately cannot be inferred; less mind aribu-
tion may lead to more aggression, or people may perceive a robot
as being less mindful in order to justify their aggressive responses.
Table 3: Mean aggression ratio (SD) for both studies
low anthrop. high anthrop. total
Pilot Control .31 (.25) .35(.23) .31 (.24)
Power prime .31 (.23) .34 (.19) .32 (.21)
total .31 (.24) .34 (.21) .33 (.22)
Main Control .36 (.26) .34 (.21) .35 (.24)
Power prime .29 (.25) .29 (.25) .29 (.25)
total .32 (.26) .31 (.24) .32 (.25)
NB: ratio is the number of negative to positive responses; data has
been square root transformed to facilitate interpretation.
e second main nding was the failure of the power prime.
is could be taken as evidence that humans do not dehumanise
robots in the same way they dehumanise humans; while aggression
is related to (a lack of) mind perception, factors that inuence mind
perception in fellow humans do not inuence robot mind perception.
Alternatively, the manipulation method could have been biased.
While power priming was copied from previous studies, where
it had been an eective method [17, 20], the topic had not been
adopted verbatim. Given that the majority of the respondents
lived in the US, together with the recent developments in the oval
oce, “president for a day” seemed to have triggered more than
just feelings of power. For example, some participants used the
essay mainly to express their unhappiness with the current POTUS.
us, in the main experiment the design was kept identical to the
pilot except for the prime. We adopted an essay topic that had been
previously described [16] and established [17, 20] to manipulate
dehumanisation.
3 MAIN STUDY
Except for the power prime, this study’s design was identical to the
pilot.
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Participants. Only Amazon Mechanical Turk was used as
a recruitment platform for the main study, as participants on this
platform are reimbursed only aer their submied data has been
approved, which allowed the researchers to discard participants
who failed the aention check. 129 participants completed the
essay and questionnaires. Of those, 12 submied an essay that was
either o-topic or had been copy-pasted from the internet and were
removed, resulting in a dataset with 117 participants. 49% were
male, the average age was 38 years (SD = 11.0), and the majority
(80%) resided in the USA.
3.1.2 Procedure, materials, and measurements. e procedure
was identical to the pilot study, save for the essays. In the dehu-
manisation condition participants now had to recall and describe
in detail a personal incident in which they had power over another
individual or individuals [16, 17, 20]. e visit to the shopping mall
in the control condition was changed to a visit to a grocery store, as
some participants in the pilot study had remarked that they hadn’t
been to a mall in years.
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e materials and measurements were identical to those used in
the pilot study.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Reliability, randomisation and manipulation check. Both
questionnaires were reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .86 for the MAS;
.90 for the GQr). e full MAS again was reverse-scored, so that a
higher score indicated a higher degree of dehumanisation.
e four conditions did not dier signicantly from each other
with respect to the participants’ country of residence, gender or
the total number of interactions. e groups did not dier signi-
cantly in sample size, with 28 participants in the low anthropomor-
phism/control condition, 25 in the high anthropomorphism/control
condition, 31 in the low anthropomorphism/dehumanisation condi-
tion, and 33 in the high anthropomorphism/dehumanisation condi-
tion, χ2(3, N = 117) = 1.26, p = .74.
Participants’ mean age diered signicantly between the groups,
F (1,115) = 12.24, p < .001. Since age is correlated to the aggression
ratio (ρ = -.15), it was included in the models as a control variable.
Participants in the high anthropomorphism condition rated their
robot as signicantly more anthropomorphous (M = 6.62, SD = 1.96)
than participants in the low anthropomorphism condition (M =
5.27, SD = 2.13), F (1,113) = 8.50, p < .01, no signicant main eect
for the dehumanisation condition or the interaction term, ps > .33.
Participants in the dehumanisation condition did not aribute sig-
nicantly less mind to their robot (M = 5.55, SD = 2.10) compared to
the control condition (M = 5.24, SD = 1.86), F (1,113) = 1.01, p = .32,
no main eect for the anthropomorphism condition or the interac-
tion term, ps > .58. us, the manipulation of anthropomorphism
had been successful, but the manipulation of dehumanisation had
not. e MAS was once more used as a measure of dehumanisa-
tion, and again the dehumanisation condition will be referred to
as the “power prime condition” from this point on. See Table 2 for
descriptives of both questionnaires.
On average, 74% of participants interaction paths overlapped
(SD = .09%).
3.2.2 Main analysis. As in the pilot study, a series of binomial
models were composed and compared. e dependent variable
was the proportion of negative responses. e predictors were a
subset of either or both experimental conditions and the scores
on the MAS and the GQr, with age as a control variable. e
scores on both questionnaires were centered in order to facilitate
interpretation of the models. Chi-square statistics were calculated
to assess if a proposed model was beer at predicting aggressive
responses than the null model (which holds no predictors). e
Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to compare the models
amongst each other, with a lower AIC score indicating a beer t
compared to the alternative model, and a dierence (∆AIC ) of 2
points or less indicating the models are approximately equal [6].
e rst model contained the two experimental conditions, an
interaction term, and the control variable. In this model only age
was a signicant predictor, b = −.02, z = −2.30, p = .02. is model
still outperformed the null model on predicting the number of
aggressive responses,χ2(4, N = 117) = 10.13, p = .04; AIC = 594.46.
In the second model, the MAS was added as a main predictor and
as a factor in the interaction term. is model returned main eects
Table 4: Descriptives of themodels predicting the aggression
ratio in the main study
Predictors b z AIC




age −0.02 −2.30* 594.46








age −0.02 −2.55** 545.27
*, **, and *** denote signicance at p < .05, p < .01, and p < .001,
respectively (two-tailed).
for power prime and age, b = −.68, z = −3.10, p = .002 and b = −.02,
z = −2.55, p = .01, respectively. ere were interactions between
the two conditions, b = .75, z = 2.50, p = .01, and between either
condition and the MAS scores, b = .41, z = 3.07, p = .002 for the
interaction with the anthropomorphism condition, and b = .42, z =
4.92, p < .001 for the interaction with the power prime condition;
and a three-way interaction between the conditions and the MAS
score, b = −.60, z = −3.77, p < .001. e model was signicantly
beer than the null model at predicting aggressive responses; χ2(8,
N = 117) = 67.14, p < .001; and its AIC indicated it to be preferable
over the rst model, AIC = 545.27, ∆AIC = 49.19.
e second model is thus identied as the model that predicts
robot bullying best. See Table 4 for the descriptives of both models.
3.2.3 Model interpretation. e chosen model gets easier to
interpret when the regression equations are wrien out for each of
the four conditions. See Table 5.
For the low anthropomorphic robot in the control condition,
only age predicted aggression; for each additional year of the par-
ticipants’ age, the log odds of an aggressive response decreased
with .02.
For the high anthropomorphic robot in the control condition,
mind aribution was a signicant predictor of aggression as well;
for every point that the MAS score was above the mean (i.e. the
Table 5: Regression equations for the four conditions
Condition Regression equation
Low ant, control loд(ratio) ∼ −.73 − .02 ∗ aдe
High ant, control loд(ratio) ∼ −.73 + .41 ∗MAS − .02 ∗ aдe
Low ant, power loд(ratio) ∼ −1.41 + .42 ∗MAS − .02 ∗ aдe
High ant, power loд(ratio) ∼ −.66 + .23 ∗MAS − .02 ∗ aдe
NB: ratio is the number of negative to positive responses.
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less mind was aributed), the log odds of an aggressive response
increased with .41.
All else being equal, the low anthropomorphic robot in the power
prime condition had a lower baseline rate of aggressive responses
compared to the other conditions. e relationship between age,
mind aribution, and aggression was similar to the anthropomor-
phic robot in the control condition.
Finally, the overall lower rate of abuse of robots in the high
anthropomorphism/control condition (Table 3) was not due to a
lower baseline rate, but to a less strong eect of mind aribution
on aggression.
4 DISCUSSION
As social robotics take up an increasingly prominent place in both
science and society, the issue of robot abuse becomes more rel-
evant. While a variety of scholars have observed abuse of both
embodied [26, 53] and virtual [11, 61] agents, there is still very lile
fundamental research on where this behaviour originates from.
e current studies took up a (social) psychology paradigm and
investigated the inuence of anthropomorphism and dehumani-
sation on verbal abuse of a virtual robot. e hypotheses - dehu-
manisation leads to more aggression, an eect that is enhanced by
anthropomorphism - were partially conrmed. In the pilot study,
while aggression was unaected by power and anthropomorphism,
a lack of mind aribution (an indication of dehumanisation) was
directly related to abuse. In the main study, this eect became
moderated by feelings of power and anthropomorphism.
Against our expectations, priming participants with power failed
to induce dehumanisation tendencies. Although the relationship
between dehumanisation and robot bullying still could be studied
by using the mind aribution score that was originally intended
as manipulation check, the eect of power (null in the pilot and
decreasing aggression in the main study) does raise some questions.
e most glaring question - did the prime actually manage to
induce feelings of power in participants - cannot be tested with the
data. However, the prime was adopted because of its solid previous
establishment as inducing feelings of power [16, 17, 20], and its
inuence on behaviour in the current studies (albeit not through
dehumanisation) indicates that something indeed was triggered.
If we assume for the moment that this was power, then why
did power not inuence dehumanisation? How to explain the
drop in aggressive tendencies aer being power-primed in the
low anthropomorphism condition? And why did the power prime
decrease the inuence of mind aribution on aggression when the
robot is anthropomorphic?
A potential explanation is that power worked as an inhibitor.
Following this ratio, people bully robots out of uncertainty or per-
ceived threat, as some sort of testing and probing. When they feel
powerful, their dominance already feels established, which allows
them to be friendlier. Indeed, Zlotowski et al. [68] recently found
that the more autonomous a robot appeared to be, the more threat-
ened people felt - a feeling that mediated the relationship between
robot autonomy and participants’ negative aitudes towards robots.
Feelings of power in the current study may have reduced perceived
autonomy in robots, or counteracted its moderation of negative
aitudes through reducing the experienced threat.
is interpretation of the results provides an intriguing para-
digm for future studies on robot abuse. Like the bullying of humans,
robots bullying rests upon dehumanisation. But the power imbal-
ance, which is so central in human-human abuse [60], appears to
take on a dierent role in human-robot abuse. Further investigating
the interaction between power, perceived threat, dehumanisation,
and abuse of robots would lead to deeper understanding of how ex-
actly the human brain processes robots and could be of tremendous
value to the eld of human-robot interaction.
Also interesting is the independence of anthropomorphism and
dehumanisation, concepts that have been labelled each others re-
verse before [13, 22]. Humanlikeness in a robot did not inuence
aggression or mind perception, but mind perception on itself was
related to robot abuse. ese ndings match the work of Zlotowski
et al. [68], who found that robot appearance did not substantially
inuence mind aribution; and contradict the proposition that an-
thropomorphism and dehumanisation are simply two extremes of
the same scale [as expressed by for example by 63].
e presented ndings, albeit fundamental in nature, have impli-
cations for applied robotics as well. Of course, it would be far too
early to recommend complicated robot behaviours designs that aim
to reduce robot dehumanisation and enhance perceived power of
the user; more elaborate studies, with embodied robots, are needed
to pinpoint the exact relationship between dehumanisation, power,
and robot bullying. However, considering the link between mind
perception and aggression, one might consider giving priority to
robot qualities that increase its perceived capability of thinking and
feeling, over humanlikeness and aliveness.
e rst major limitation of the current studies is that it was
conducted in a virtual environment. While this has its perks (e.g. the
online disinhibition eect), the current literature is undecided on
whether this is entirely equatable to embodied robots [35, 45, 47, 59];
the same goes for online versus oine bullying [39, 42]. While we
argue that the underlying psychological mechanisms are the same
and the results can therefore be generalised, follow-up studies will
have to empirically conrm that this is indeed the case.
Robot anthropomorphism was manipulated with minimal mea-
sures. On one hand, this allowed for a “cleaner” design, where it
could be clear that it was anthropomorphism, and not for example
perceived strength or size of the robot, that inuenced bullying
behaviour. On the downside, the dierence in anthropomorphism
between the conditions, although signicant, is small.
Finally, as mentioned above, the dehumanisation manipulation
was checked only by measuring mind aribution, and not feelings
of power. However, by adopting the instructions verbatim from
successful studies in the main experiment, it seems less likely that a
well-established prime suddenly failed to work than that it simply
did not inuence mind aribution. Nonetheless, in future studies
inclusion a measurement of power might be considered as a second
manipulation check.
e eld of human-robot interaction is very young, but has been
around long enough to suggest that understanding the motivation
behind robot abuse may prove to be no easier than understanding
what drives people to pick on each other. Nonetheless, gaining
insights on robot bullying will benet both our understanding of
the human mind as the development of an environment where a
small cleaning robot can do its job without fear of being harrassed.
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[5] Drazen Brscić, Hiroyuki Kidokoro, Yoshitaka Suehiro, and Takayuki Kanda. 2015.
Escaping from children’s abuse of social robots. In Proceedings of the tenth annual
ACM/IEEE international conference on Human-robot interaction. ACM, ACM/IEEE,
Portland, USA, 59–66.
[6] Kenneth P Burnham and David R Anderson. 2003. Model selection and multimodel
inference: a practical information-theoretic approach. Springer Science & Business
Media, New York. hps://doi.org/10.1198/tech.2003.s147
[7] Emanuele Castano and Miroslaw Koa. 2009. Dehumanization: Humanity
and its denial. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12, 6 (2009), 695–697.
hps://doi.org/10.1177/1368430209350265
[8] Emanuele Castano, Miroslaw Koa, Sabina Čehajić, Rupert Brown, and Roberto
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